Why detection alone cannot prove authenticity
A detector analyses a finished file and returns a probability that it is synthetic or manipulated. That is helpful for screening, but it works backwards from the pixels and can be wrong in both directions. It also says nothing about when or where the photo was taken, which is often the part that matters in a dispute.
So a clean detector result is reassuring, not conclusive. To actually prove a photo, you need evidence created at the moment of capture, not inferred from the file afterwards.
Prove it at the source with a seal
The reliable approach is to bind the proof to the photo the instant it is taken. Danaya seals a photo at capture by computing a SHA-256 fingerprint of the file and signing it together with the GPS location and a server timestamp. Change a single pixel later and the fingerprint no longer matches, so any edit is obvious.
Capture is live only. You cannot import a file or feed in an AI-generated image and have it sealed, which is what stops someone from sealing a fake. The result is not a probability: it is a definite record that this exact file existed at this place and time.
Let anyone verify without trusting you
A proof only helps if the other side can check it themselves. Each sealed photo gets a public verification link. The recipient opens it and sees that the file matches its fingerprint, along with the captured location and time, with nothing to install and no account to create.
That is the practical difference. Use a detector to screen media you receive from others, and use sealing plus a verification link to prove the media you produce, whether it is a delivery photo, site progress, an insurance claim or condition on handover.